The statement separates two things that normally travel together: a theory being true and a theory being accepted. Read one way, it is a claim about truth itself. Whether a theory correctly describes the world does not depend on what anyone believes about it; the Earth moved round the Sun long before astronomers agreed that it did. Read another way, it is a claim about what science requires: that once a theory is true, persuading other scientists is an optional extra.
The first reading is close to obviously right. The second is the interesting one, and it turns on two words. "Need" invites the question: needed for what? For the theory to be true, to be known, or to be used? And "accepted by scientists" could mean a show of hands, or it could mean surviving the scrutiny of people trained to find its faults. I will take the statement in its stronger sense: that once a theory is in fact true, acceptance by the scientific community adds nothing that matters. On that reading it says more than that truth is independent of opinion. It says that the long and often slow work of persuading a scientific community is, for a true theory, wasted effort.
The strongest argument against the statement is that truth is not a label anyone can read off a theory. No one meets a theory already stamped "true". What we meet are theories that have been tested, criticised and, so far, not refuted. Acceptance, in the sense of surviving that process, is the only means by which a true theory becomes distinguishable from an attractive false one. Without it, the true theory stands beside its rivals with no better claim than they have. Scientists were once confident that heat was a kind of fluid and that the continents could not move. What eventually separated true from false in those cases was not anyone's confidence but further testing, and a community willing to change its mind when the results came in.
A second argument concerns use. A true theory that nobody accepts does almost no work: it is not taught, tested further, built on or applied. When Ignaz Semmelweis argued that doctors who washed their hands would lose fewer patients, he was right, but most of his colleagues rejected the idea, and the practice he recommended was not widely adopted until after his death. In every sense that mattered to those patients, his true theory needed acceptance badly.
Finally, the demand for acceptance protects science from its own members. If a scientist could bypass peers by declaring a theory true, the same privilege would be available to every crank, and the community would lose its main way of correcting mistakes.
I agree with the statement only in its narrow sense. Truth does not wait for a vote, and a theory rejected by every scientist alive could still be correct. But I disagree with the stronger claim, because acceptance does two jobs that truth cannot do for itself: it is our evidence that a theory is true, and it is the condition for that truth being put to use. My agreement therefore depends on what "acceptance" means. Where acceptance follows evidence, a true theory needs it, because without it we have no way of telling the theory apart from its rivals.
Where acceptance follows prestige or habit, as it did among Semmelweis's critics, the theory remains true and the fault lies with the scientists, not with the theory. Continental drift shows the same pattern. Wegener's idea was largely right, yet it became working science only once evidence from the sea floor persuaded geologists, and that persuasion is exactly what the statement treats as unnecessary. So the statement is right about what makes a theory true, and wrong about what makes a true theory useful.